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1. INTRODUCTION
According to received economic theory, the implementation of price dis-
crimination by a firm requires market power, (at least) in the short-term. 
However, casual observation, confirmed by empirical studies 1, demon-
strates that in industries that appear to be extremely competitive there is 
* Invited Adjunt Professor at Instituto Politécnico de Tomar. This paper is a version 
of chapter 6 of my Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa doctoral thesis. I would like to 
thank my advisor José Amado da Silva for helpful suggestions and comments.
1 Without pretending to be exhaustive, we can mention the following empirical studies 
that test the presence of price discrimination in competitive environments: Shepard 
(1991) – Gasoline service stations, Goldberg (1995) and Verboven (1996) – American 
and European car markets, respectively, Leslie (1999) – Broadway theatre (monop-
oly), Busse and Rysman (2001) – yellow pages advertising, Clerides (2001) – books, 
Cohen (2000) and Cohen (2001) – paper towels, Crawford and Shum (2001) – cable TV 
(monopoly), MacManus (2001) – coffee, Besanko et al. (2001) – ketchup. 
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widespread practice of price discrimination 2, especially its second degree 
variant (Nonlinear Pricing); in fact, it seems clear that it is more diffi-
cult to identify competitive markets where there is no practice of a form 
of price discrimination, than the opposite: highly competitive industries 
such as air transport, removal companies, rental (car, equipment, space), 
hotels and restaurants are obvious examples (Dana, 1998, quoted in Baumol 
(2002)) 3. In these industries, the economic profit is approximately zero, 
the barriers to entry low, and firms are often mere price-takers without 
market power (no restriction of output of the industries in which firms 
operate 4), mainly due to the conditions of free entry and exit 5.
2 As Baumol (2002) refers to, this finding had already been made by Jules Dupuit in 
the mid-nineteenth century: “There is almost no industry where this phenomenon 
is not present” (1852-53, quoted in Ekelund e Hébert (1999)).
3 Many other examples of highly competitive markets may be mentioned: the com-
puter industry (hardware), bookstores, transportation, ready-to-wear, theatres, 
laundries, advertising, automobiles. Wilson (1993) offers the following list of indus-
tries that employ Nonlinear Pricing (without specifying the degree of competition 
or contestability generally verified): Energy, Telecommunications, Express Mail, 
Air Transport, Transportation by Truck, Gas Transmission, Advertising, Rental 
(Equipment, Vehicles, Space, Rooms), Banking and Financial Services, Publications, 
Equipment (computers, copiers), Retail Sales, Hospitality, Cable TV.
4 See Levine (2000: p. 10) which underlines the relationship between market power 
and the capacity to restrict the output level of the industry: “To find market power, 
one will be required to do a conduct or structure analysis that is independent of 
multiple prices and which is designed to find restriction of output by intention or 
effect.” Obviously, the restriction of output is, in this framework, regarded as a vehi-
cle to raise the company’s prices above the competitive level, and keep them there; 
this ability to keep prices above the competitive level (absent when there is free 
entry) constitutes itself as the true test of the existence of market power (which does 
not exclude other types of evidence that can be used to complement the argument 
that a certain firm possesses market power). We shall return to this subject, trying 
to correctly define the concept of market power (see Section 4, p. 58). 
5 Certainly, in the industries mentioned, there will be a certain degree of differen-
tiation between the firms, which would simplify the explanation of price discrim-
ination maintenance in extremely competitive markets. Levine (2000) attempts to 
dismantle this argument, noting that it would be a great coincidence that differenti-
ated firms possess only, and exactly, the amount of local monopoly power necessary 
to cover the sunk and common costs without generating profits or losses. Moreover, 
Baumol (2002) suggests that price discrimination will be mandatory in contestable 
markets, when certain conditions are met, without specifying any requirements 
regarding the differentiation of the firms’ product lines. 
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How to explain this phenomenon (price discrimination without market 
power), which is notable for its ubiquity, bearing in mind that one of the 
accepted fundamental prerequisites for the feasibility of price discrimina-
tion is the existence of market power? 6
The core development of the present work is the explanation of the sus-
tainability of Nonlinear Pricing, and price discrimination in general, in 
environments of perfect contestability (a concept that encompasses as a 
special case the notion of perfect competition), partial equilibrium models 
for various types of markets having been deduced. Thus, Nonlinear Pricing 
systems emerge as mechanisms that, in competitive environments, and 
with minimal central planning (centralisation of information), will allow 
greater social efficiency, constituting a “second-best invisible hand”; the-
ory endows thus, a greater adherence to reality. The practical implications 
of this new competitive model are diverse, from which we highlight its 
influence in regulatory and competition policies.
The most relevant approaches towards, and recent contributions related 
to, this issue (and that inspired the present article, setting its path), are 
discussed in Section 2. Section 3 explains the sustainability of Nonlinear 
Pricing, and of price discrimination in general, in perfectly contestable 
environments, partial equilibrium models for various types of markets 
having been deduced. Section 4 revisits the question of market power, ana-
lysing alternative definitions and tests. Implications of the analysis for 
Economic Theory are discussed in the final section.
6 The literature (see, for instance, Stole (2007: p. 2226)) establishes that price discrim-
ination is feasible only when certain conditions are satisfied: (i) firms have market 
power, at least in the short-term, (ii) consumers can be segmented directly or indi-
rectly (there is a segmentation tool), and (iii) arbitrage is impossible, limited or con-
trolled by the original producer (“Resale exclusion is essentially an elaboration of 
the requirement of monopoly power, because it prevents competition from custom-
ers acting as secondary suppliers in resale markets” (Wilson, 1993: p. 11)).
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2. RECENT APPROACHES IN THE LITERATURE 
OF ECONOMICS AND ANTITRUST
In recent years, relevant literature has emerged dealing with the theme 
of the present article (and inspiring it), namely through its implications 
in Antitrust 7.
2.1. LEVINE (2000) and the IMPORTANCE OF COMMON 
COSTS
The article that launched the debate is Levine (2000), the main motiva-
tion of which was to prove, essentially to regulatory and antitrust agen-
cies, that the presence of price discrimination is not by itself an indicator 
of market power (this is not a necessary or sufficient condition), since it 
is a phenomenon observed in competitive markets where firms are actors 
without any market power 8. Levine argues that the presence of common 
costs is what induces the need for firms to adopt the practice of price 
discrimination as a way to maintain their viability (and only the viabil-
ity – zero economic profit) in the least production-restrictive way.
Levine does not explicitly separate the treatment of mono and multi- 
product firms, and for the former, the appointment of common costs will 
certainly refer to fixed costs: “What producers of competitive products 
and services that share common costs do is to charge different customers 
who buy different units or different products different prices “(Levine, 
2000: p.7); implicitly the first reference is directed to single product situa-
tions, while the second indicates multiproduct contexts. 
7 See essentially Levine (2000), Baumol (2002) and the articles that constitute a sym-
posium on the subject recently published in the Antitrust Law Journal (2003, Vol. 70, 
No. 3): Baker (2003), Baumol and Swanson (2003), Hurdle and McFarland (2003), 
Klein and Wiley (2003a, 2003b) and Ward (2003). It should be noted, as Baumol 
and Swanson (2003) underline, that traditionally legislation and academic thought 
regarding Antitrust accepts that the presence of price discrimination is proof of the 
existence of market power on the part of its practitioners. 
8 Levine attributes the lack of market power of firms in a particular industry to free 
entry into said industry, according to the Theory of Contestability (Baumol et al. 
(1988)), see also footnote 4).
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But Levine, in the multiproduct approach, which relies mainly on the case 
of joint production 9, confuses the natural, predictable, and documented 
price difference between joint products with price discrimination 10. 
Indeed, the products produced jointly are distinct, so that the price dif-
ference in competitive markets regarding these goods does not result from 
price discrimination as established robustly by Mill-Marshall joint supply 
theory 11. There would be price discrimination in these joint production 
cases if the price differential in the supply of quantity and / or quality of 
each product set was not entirely justified by cost differences.
We consider that the great merit of Levine was to initiate a debate about 
the practice of price discrimination in competitive markets, and to under-
line the crucial role of common costs, which met an important develop-
ment by William Baumol and Daniel Swanson (Baumol 2002 and Baumol 
and Swanson 2003). 
9 Levine uses as a practical example the case of beef processors, among others, in line 
with one of the mentioned cases in John Stuart Mill’s pioneering approach (1848) 
(see footnote 10) 
10 The pioneering approach on the Theory of Joint Supply belongs to John Stuart Mill 
in his 1848 work “Principles of Political Economy”, where Mill has established the 
principle concisely (Alfred Marshall just developed its graphical analysis (Ekelund 
and Hulett (1973)) . Indeed, the apparent difficulty in distinguishing price discrim-
ination and joint supply situations dates back to at least the famous controversy 
between Taussig and Pigou on railway rates; Taussig (1891) held that the observed 
pattern of multiplicity of railway rates was conveniently explained by the Mill-
Marshall theory of joint supply (Taussig argued that the supply unit, at a scale rel-
evant to establishing the price, is not homogeneous), while Pigou (1912) explained 
this pattern through the presence of high common costs accompanied by the feasi-
bility of price discrimination among customers, given the monopoly situation cou-
pled with the presence of the necessary conditions for the practice of price discrimi-
nation (Pigou believed that the supply unit is homogeneous). See Ekelund and Hulett 
(1973) and Ekelund and Hébert (1997, Chapter 17) for a detailed description of the 
mentioned controversy. 
11 While it is generally agreed that price differences between different products do not 
constitute price discrimination, Harold Demsetz raises such a possibility in cases 
where joint supply is monopolised, being able to check for diverse relations between 
joint product prices and their marginal costs; this would be a case of price discrimi-
nation if not dealing with different products (Demsetz (1973): p. 390-1). This observa-
tion could certainly lead us to the debate on used criteria to classify products as dif-
ferent or just horizontally differentiated, but it takes us away from the purpose of 
the present work. 
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2.2. BAUMOL (2002) and the COMPETITIVE DYNAMIC 
EQUILIBRIUM 
Baumol (2002), inspired by Levine (2000), and already working in the polar 
(and hypothetical) environment of perfect contestability (which includes 
the perfectly competitive markets as a particular case), arrives at a central 
result that postulates the existence of competitive equilibria (in industries 
where economies of scale are important), with price discrimination:
“In a perfectly contestable market in which a seller can separate customers into 
distinct groups with different demand elasticities, and can prevent its product 
from being transferred from one customer to another, the firm’s equilibrium eco-
nomic profits will be zero. But, except for cases constituting a set of measure zero, 
avoidance of losses will require discriminatory prices.” (Baumol, 2002, p. 3).
Baumol proves this proposition succouring in three observations, which 
derive from basic economic analysis:
 − If consumers can be divided into subsets with different elasticity of 
demand, the discriminatory pricing generates higher profits than 
uniform pricing 12, 13;
 − The absence of barriers to entry and exit nullifies the possibility of 
positive economic profits, but makes it possible to avoid a negative 
economic profit (i.e., it does not prevent incumbent firms from cov-
ering all their costs, including common costs, fixed and recurring 
sunk costs);
 − The zero profits a firm can earn in a contestable market equilibrium 
can only be obtained from its profit-maximising price vector, which 
is normally discriminatory. 
 − Some remarks are necessary. In the case of a (natural) perfectly con-
testable monopolistic market, the novelty of the proposition is not 
12 As Baumol and Swanson (2003: p. 673, footnote 24), recall, appealing to a notion of 
elementary optimisation theory), “…an unconstrained maximum is always at least 
as great as the corresponding maximum under constraint…” (profit maximisation 
constrained by the use of uniform pricing).
13 It is important to note that the use of Second Degree Price Discrimination (Nonlinear 
Pricing) may be a vehicle to overcome the inefficiencies posed by asymmetric infor-
mation (especially in adverse selection and moral hazard environments) and thus 
avoid the “narrowing” or even destruction of the market.
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significant, since Baumol et al. (1988: Chapter 8) reported that in 
such a market Ramsey discriminatory prices are sustainable (suf-
ficient, but not necessary condition) against entry 14. The great nov-
elty of Baumol`s proposition (2002) relating to his previous work con-
cerns the equilibrium in perfectly contestable markets that contain 
two or more firms (i.e., not natural monopolies); effectively, Baumol 
et al. (1988: Chapter 11) produced a theorem which stated that in such 
markets the only sustainable price would be equal to marginal cost. 
But according to Baumol (2002), usually at least some of the prices 
of incumbent firms will be greater than the marginal cost to permit 
coverage of sunk, fixed and common costs 15; Baumol (2002) admits 
14 This hypothesis is condensed in their Weak Invisible Hand Theorem (Baumol et al. 
(1988: chapter 8)). Note that, according to the authors, the concept of sustainability is 
an economically substantive generalisation of classical competitive equilibrium and, 
correspondingly, the notion of perfectly contestable market is an equally substantive 
generalisation of perfectly competitive markets (Baumol et al. (1988, p.271)). It should 
also be noted that, traditionally (see, for example, Braeutigam (1989, pp.1320-7), and 
this would be the case in Baumol et al. (1988), Ramsey Pricing in multiproduct envi-
ronments does not imply nonlinear prices for each product, but rather linear prices 
according to the inverse elasticity rule for each product / market; it should be noted 
at the outset that efficiency can be further increased if the firm practices nonlin-
ear pricing for each product (which puts into question the sustainability through 
Ramsey pricing with linear prices per product, as argued in the Weak Invisible 
Hand Theorem; indeed, Panzar and Postlewaite (1984) and Shaffer (1987) had already 
shown that nonlinear prices dominate linear prices in contestable natural monopo-
lies (regarding non-decreasing marginal costs) via its Pareto superiority (being that 
a Pareto-inefficient rate is unsustainable), after Mirman and Sibley (1980) having 
had reported that a multiproduct monopolist with increasing returns to scale offers 
a nonlinear price tariff, and Willig (1978) having proved that it is always possible to 
construct a Pareto-superior tariff to one that employs linear prices different from 
marginal costs), also overcoming in this manner the issue of asymmetric informa-
tion and its harmful effects on the performance of these markets. 
15 Indeed, Baumol et al. (1988) considered that the practice of marginal-cost prices was 
economically viable under the assumption that economies of scale were “exhausted”, 
and the quantities demanded by the market at these optimal prices were superior to 
the Minimum Efficient Scale (MES) of the firm in question (see Baumol et al. (1988: 
p.359). At his recent approaches above (see p. 44), Baumol essentially targets “new 
economy” industries (Biotechnology, Software, Semiconductor, ...) that, due to sig-
nificant sunk , fixed, and common costs, eventually “force” firms to offer certain 
products at production levels for which there are specific economies of scale (see also 
footnote 17).
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that this phenomenon is an invitation to entry 16, which helps to 
produce a dynamic equilibrium (“churning” equilibria) with price 
discrimination 17. Zero economic profit for the industry means that 
the entry of firms into the industry requires the exit of the incum-
bent or of some newly-entrees.
16 Baumol (2002: p.19, footnote 14) notes that this invitation for entry has a limited 
practical applicability, since in this framework the entrant would have to replicate 
the incumbent’s product line almost completely, while still referring that this is one 
of the reasons why the threat of entry may reduce profit to zero without excluding 
price discrimination. Other factors also contribute to the fact that the referred invi-
tation for entry is not so effective, such as uncertainty (the argument assumes that 
the entrant has very precise estimates of their marginal cost and demand elastic-
ity – which allows for evaluating the demand response to a small reduction in price 
by the entrant), the established reputation of the incumbent, inertia of consumers 
to switch suppliers and the probability of a direct deterrent reaction by incumbents 
through their pricing (Baumol and Swanson , 2003: p.677). 
17 The vision of Contestability Theory (see Baumol et al. (1988)) was that an oligopoly 
operating in a perfectly contestable market would be forced to operate with mar-
ginal-cost prices in equilibrium, as already mentioned. This first-best situation 
required that business costs were trans-ray convex (see Baumol et al. (1988: Ch 4D) to 
clarify the concept of trans-ray convexity, which is directly related to the existence 
of scope economies; we can briefly refer that this means that in the multiproduct 
context scope economies counterbalance the effect of specific economies of scale, 
and thus, multiproduct production is relatively less costly than specialised produc-
tion), which, with their scale economies “exhausted”, their unit costs remained con-
stant for significant expansions beyond MES, and that the quantities demanded by 
the market at optimal prices (made to marginal costs) were superior to the MES 
(Baumol et al, 1988, p.359). However, Baumol (2002) states that viability requires 
that at least some prices are higher than marginal costs (which does not necessar-
ily imply price discrimination, see footnote 14, in his reference to Ramsey pricing), 
contradicting its previous position; as mentioned in footnote 15, the new conviction 
is due to the conjecture that certain products will have to be offered in the area of 
specific economies of scale due to the magnitude of sunk, fixed, and common costs. 
But Baumol fails to explain the sustainability of the practice of price above marginal 
costs (and therefore the sustainability of the supply of products with economies of 
scale in an oligopoly), because a competitor could increase the supply of product up 
to the area of scale diseconomies, where the marginal-cost price would generate sol-
vency (assuming fixed capacity at its optimum level); recognising in a way this gap, 
Baumol notes that such a configuration will not be perfectly sustainable, consti-
tuting a call for entry despite the expected null economic profit postulated by free 
entry (Baumol, 2002: p. 18-20).
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3. CONCEPT CLARIFICATION AND THE CRUCIAL 
NOTION OF SUSTAINABILITY 
Baumol (2002), Baumol and Swanson (2003), and Levine (2000) based the 
outcome of competitive equilibrium with price discrimination – in the 
line of Ramsey pricing in multiproduct environments – on the need that 
companies have to cover their costs, especially common, fixed, and sunk 
ones (Levine particularly stresses the role of common costs) 18.
These authors do not express separation between markets of differenti-
ated products and perfect substitutes because they are indeed dealing with 
price differentials between different, or even joint products manufactured 
by multiproduct firms traded in distinct markets 19, 20.
However, the observed phenomenon that we want to study in this work 
(and which actually constitutes price discrimination, in economic terms) 
is the generalisation of price differentiation between identical and simi-
lar products (quality differentials), not entirely explained by differences 
18 Note that there is an apparent contradiction between the proposal of Baumol (2002) 
and the role of sunk costs arising out of Contestability Theory, of which Baumol was 
a major mentor (see Baumol (1982)); effectively, the absence of sunk costs consti-
tutes a precondition for a market to be contestable. Baumol (2002) explains that con-
flict disappears, indicating that the sunk costs that are important for his analysis, 
and one of the main reasons for the business practice of price discrimination, are 
recurrent (e.g., continuous expenses for R & D in companies in “hi-tech” industries), 
which due to this characteristic do not constitute barriers to entry since they are 
“obligations” extended to incumbents of such industries, thus not conferring them 
with competitive advantage.
19 See Carbonneau et al. (2004: p.3) that in a critique of the extension of the basic model 
of price discrimination by Levine (2000), and apparently detecting such “confusion” 
(which in our opinion stems from the concept of Ramsey pricing in multiproduct 
environments and its traditional connection, which is direct in Nonlinear pricing, 
with price discrimination) report: “…, and differences in product offerings are not 
necessarily price discrimination.” 
20 It should be noted that Baumol (2002) commences by addressing price discrimina-
tion for a product offered by a multiproduct firm (which will be an actual case of 
price discrimination), but in the discussion regarding sustainability of this practice 
succours to frameworks provided in Baumol et al. (1988) that for the multiproduct 
case do not contemplate nor directly concern the possibility of nonlinear prices for 
each product.
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in costs (definition of price discrimination) seen in markets considered as 
competitive 21.
It is paramount, thus, to explain how price discrimination can be sus-
tained without market power, which eventually will provide indications 
on the types of (partial) equilibria developed in such markets 22.
Firstly, it should be noted that the existence of absolute free entry and 
exit in a market (i.e. perfect contestability) is a sufficient condition for 
the firms operating in this market, regardless of any other factors, not 
having any power market 23. Following the investigation we set ourselves 
described in the previous paragraph, we also evaluate whether the indi-
cators traditionally used to infer the existence of market power by a firm 
(e.g. Lerner Index) are effectively relevant.
21 Such phenomenon is described and exemplified earlier in this work (see Introduction). 
22 It must be emphasised that we consider the assertions of Baumol (2002) and Baumol 
and Swanson (2003) to be valid with regard to price discrimination in multiproduct 
environments being mandatory in perfectly contestable markets (see pp. 44-6); in 
the course of our sustainability analysis we provide and explain the reasons why we 
believe these assertions are valid.
23 See footnote 14, where it is mentioned that the notion of perfectly contestable mar-
ket is also a substantive generalisation of the perfectly competitive market (Baumol 
et al. (1988: p.271)).
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3.1. Markets of homogeneous products / 
monoproduct firms
in the case of competition between monoproduct firms providing perfect 
substitutes we have actually to assume some type of extensive game (e.g., 
the Cournot game, as suggested in Wilson (1993)) in order to prevent in the 
short-term the outcome of uniform marginal cost pricing 24, 25, or to adopt 
the vision of Baumol (2002) (for which in the present case, a market pop-
ulated by monoproduct firms applies mutatis mutandis) that it has gener-
ated a dynamic equilibrium (“churning equilibria”, see pp. 45-6), since in 
a perfectly contestable oligopolistic market, prices above marginal cost are 
not sustainable 26.
24 “…, Cournot competition among several firms drives marginal prices down, as com-
pared to monopoly, but it does not eliminate nonlinear pricing. Profit margins van-
ish only if the number of firms is very large, since the percentage profit margin is 
1/n η (p (q), q)”.”…; consequently, the number of viable firms in an industry is lim-
ited whenever investment and fixed operating costs must be recovered from profits. 
Nonlinear pricing is then a predictable outcome, …”(Wilson (1993, p.307 and p. 312), 
explaining aspects of the outcome of the Cournot game, being implicit in this argu-
ment that firms operate with excess economic capacity (excess capacity estimated at 
each instant the difference between economic capacity – production at minimum 
average total cost – and actual production (Amado da Silva (1991: p.50), see also foot-
note 29), but not as high as it would be if they were limited to employing linear pric-
ing. It should also be noted that this type of equilibrium is not sustainable under 
free entry and does not constitute a true equilibrium in contestable markets (see 
Baumol et al. (1988: p. 332)).
25 Mandy (1991), Hayes (1987), and Locay and Rodriguez (1992) presented models where 
binomial tariffs dominate uniform pricing in competitive homogeneous product 
markets; however, these studies were aimed at special cases where binomial tariffs 
facilitate transfers between individuals that are not possible with uniform prices.
26 “The conclusion, then, is that the structure of the equilibria described here can eas-
ily invite entry despite the zero expected profits for any pertinent industry as a 
whole. But those zero profits mean that the market has no room for both incum-
bents and entrants, so that after entry the demise of some firms can confidently be 
expected. Consequently, constant and unending strategic battle for survival must be 
common, with the time trajectory characterised by a ceaseless inflow of entrants, 
followed by a stream of exiting firms composed in part of entrants, in part of former 
incumbents.” Baumol (2002: p. 20), generally describing the dynamic equilibrium 
(“churning equilibria”) that is generated in contestable markets due to the non-sus-
tainability of prices superior to marginal costs, which, in the outlined conditions 
are discriminatory due to a profit maximisation posture, which in view of the indus-
try concerned, will never be positive. 
NONLINEAR PRICING WITHOUT MARKET POWER
50 R E V U E D’ÉC O N O MIE IND U S T R IE L L E ➻  N ° 161  ➻  1E R T R IME S T R E 2 018
It should be mentioned that we are, in the present work, omitting the 
case where consumers differ in their information on market prices (or 
the cost of acquiring it). Several competitive models, considering this sit-
uation, have been presented and analysed (Varian 1980, 1981, Salop and 
Stiglitz 1977, 1982, Rosenthal 1980, and Stahl 1989); a common result is 
that, in equilibrium, each firm offers a unique and uniform price (aver-
age prices increase with the proportion of non-informed consumers, or, 
from another perspective, the number of firms operating in the market), 
and price distribution in the market segments the consumer population 
between informed and non-informed buyers. It must be emphasised that 
said price discrimination occurs between firms and not at a firm level; the 
only exception is in Katz (1984) where by introducing additional assump-
tions to the model of Salop and Stiglitz (1977) (consumers who do larger 
purchases undertake a higher level of price research and tend to be bet-
ter informed than consumers who carry smaller purchases), which is 
effectively a model of monopolistic competition, has equilibria with sec-
ond degree price discrimination formally similar to that obtained in sec-
tion 3.3.1. of this work (which focuses on the sustainability of Nonlinear 
Pricing in monopolistic competition). 
3.2. Homogeneous product markets / multiproduct 
firms
Let us now consider the case of homogeneous product markets served by 
multiproduct firms. 
In perfectly contestable markets, each multiproduct firm will be required 
to produce (efficiently) a cost minimising output vector 27. Due to the pres-
ence of economies of scope, sufficient and necessary condition for the 
presence of multiproduct firms (see Baumol et al. (1988: p. 248-9)) (where 
one of its sources may be the joint production), the outputs forming the 
referred output vector are also interdependent 28. Thus, for there to be a 
27 “No firm will be able to operate inefficiently without risk of entrant takeover of its 
customers. A firm’s scale of operation can neither fall short of nor exceed the cost-
minimising level, because that would make it vulnerable to entry.”; Baumol and 
Swanson (2003: p. 670), which underlines the “requirement” of the firm being oper-
atively efficient and producing at a cost-minimising scale in a contestable market.
28 The real interdependence of outputs arises during joint production (either in fixed 
or variable proportions); when economies of scope are not based on joint production 
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situation where total average costs will be minimised, it is very likely that 
some products are produced in overcapacity and others in a situation of 
excess capacity 29, 30.
of outputs, interdependence arises in the logic of cost minimisation. It should be 
emphasised that, where there is joint production, Nonlinear Pricing of each joint 
product allows for an easier coverage of joint production costs (since it would be 
much coincidence that the uniform (linear) market price for each joint product 
allowed exactly to cover the whole joint cost of each firm, considering varying or 
fixed proportions in non-symmetric firms (see footnote 32 for reference to the issue 
of symmetry); effectively, one can easily see that many joint products are offered 
through non-linear tariffs in competitive markets: ex., quantity and quality dis-
counts in beef). 
29 From among the various output vectors belonging to the M locus (“...the set of all 
output vectors that minimise ray average costs along their own rays”; see Baumol 
et al. (1988: pp. 58-9)), only some will be technologically feasible. For these vectors, 
and due to the interdependence of the outputs of the various products (already 
embodied in the feasibility of such vectors), the production of some products, will 
most likely take place in the area of increasing average incremental costs (specific 
diseconomies of scale; overcapacity), “counterbalanced” by the production of others 
who will be in the area of declining average incremental costs (specific economies of 
scale; excess capacity) (see Amado da Silva (1991: section 2.2.) for definitions of capac-
ity and excess capacity; it should be emphasised that the concept of capacity that we 
use in this work is “economic capacity”; see also footnote 24)); it will be too much 
coincidence if the outputs of the various products meet a range of sufficiently small 
amplitude, such that all would be in the area of specific diseconomies of scale with-
out their marginal costs outweighing average stand-alone costs, as claimed to be the 
only possibility by Baumol et al. (1988: p. 255-6) (see also footnote 30). 
30 Baumol et al. (1988: p. 254-256) denied the possibility of some products being offered 
with specific economies of scale. However, these authors based such belief on a cost-
benefit analysis the firm should make in considering to abandon the production 
of a product or product subset, where the cost will be provided by the income so 
exempted, accounted for sales of such products at prices equal to their marginal 
costs, and the benefit for the cost of production spared indicated by incremental 
costs. Thus, the ratio between the benefit and cost corresponds to the degree of scale 
economies relating to that product or product subset, which would be equal to or 
less than unity (lack of specific economies of scale) for the firm not to have advan-
tages in abandoning the production of these products (it should be noted that this 
inability of the firm to offer products with some specific economies of scale implies 
that the proportion in which its various products are offered belongs to a fairly 
limited range, since no product can be offered at a level where its marginal cost 
of production, besides having to be greater than or equal to the average incremen-
tal cost, does not exceed its average stand-alone cost). However, as already referred, 
these authors assume that, as stated above, cost must be accounted for prices equal 
to the marginal cost, thus closing at the outset the possibility to practise linear or 
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Due to the pressure of free entry, the maximum profit generated by the 
firm will match, as already mentioned above, the zero economic profit, 
only allowing businesses to cover their total costs. Thus one realises that 
in the situation described in the preceding paragraph, the prices equated 
to marginal costs cannot cover the incremental costs of products offered 
with specific economies of scale, so that to have solvency, at least some of 
the prices of products offered with specific diseconomies of scale (formu-
lated to marginal costs) would have to overcome their stand-alone costs 
(average); since this scenario implies the existence of cross-subsidisa-
tion, and considering that sustainability implies its absence (Baumol et al. 
(1988): p.202), the overall price of the products offered in excess capacity 
must be at least equivalent to their average costs (incremental), thus, supe-
rior to their marginal costs.
Having established the feasibility of maintaining prices higher than mar-
ginal costs, nonlinear tariffs Pareto-dominate, under these conditions, 
linear tariffs (see pp. 44-6, including footnote 14), since a nonlinear tar-
iff constructed in accordance with the inverse- elasticity rule for each dif-
ferential market being social efficiency maximising (incidentally, Baumol 
et al. (1988: p. 202) showed that a sustainable price vector must be non- 
dominated). The effect of competition is exerted in the form of increased 
elasticity of the demand profile (Wilson, 1993) facing each company in 
each market, assuming deterministic participation (in accordance with 
the canonical model of Mussa and Rosen (1978 ), where participation is 
determined from the decision of the lowest utility consumer), as opposed 
to random participation models, such as in Rochet and Stole (2002) – where 
the decision to participate, although depending on the type of consumer, 
is random and not determined by the lowest utility consumer’s decision); 
the elasticity of the demand profile faced by a firm for each product (it 
should be noted that we assume the demands of the various products are 
independent) depends on the number of competitors and their tariffs, the 
nonlinear prices that stray from marginal costs (“…, to the system of non-discrim-
inatory simple prices that are taken throughout the analysis to constitute the only 
form of prices available” (Baumol et al., 1988, p.333)), recognising that their analysis 
excludes the presence of nonlinear prices). Thus, the new ratio accounted for (i.e., 
with nonlinear pricing) will be less than the degree of specific economies of scale, 
so there may be situations in which the firm has no advantages to abandon the pro-
duction of product subsets for which there are specific economies of scale. 
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firm establishing tariffs, for each product, minimising the overall cost 
and maximising income (which can only match the achievement of zero 
economic profit)  31.
The contribution to the common costs will be made through the revenue 
generated by the products offered in overcapacity, the prices of which can-
not exceed the respective stand-alone costs (average).
Each firm will “initially” have an optimal price-output vector that will 
lead to cost minimisation and profit maximisation, which corresponds, 
under free entry, to achieving breakeven. A competitor (or a candidate for 
entry) may have a different optimal price-output vector, which may con-
sist in lower prices within a given market 32; these lower prices would press 
31 Assuming symmetry, the nonlinear tariff, in equilibrium, for a product offered 
with specific scale economies (product i, hereinafter) is obtained as follows: once 
sustainability in contestable markets requires that the multiproduct firm we are 
considering operates with outputs leading to the minimum cost, the amount of prod-
uct i offered is determined and exogenous to the problem we are addressing; for this 
amount, determine (Ramsey Pricing, see Wilson (1993, Ch. 5 )) the nonlinear tariff 
which can cover the incremental costs of that product; the elasticity of the demand 
profile faced by the firm (which will be the basis for determining the Ramsey num-
ber that allows the coverage of the incremental costs of the product offered with spe-
cific economies of scale) is given by multiplying the number of firms (in these con-
ditions, sufficient to provide the market) by the elasticity of the market demand 
profile (up to the limit of elasticity that, with a unit Ramsey number, only allows 
for the recovery of incremental costs). 
32 We are not, therefore, requiring symmetry between firms at this stage of the rea-
soning, which gives it added practical applicability (actually, symmetric multiprod-
uct firms hardly exist in the “real world”). If the market were formed by symmet-
ric firms, they would have in equilibrium to adopt a discriminatory pricing vector 
(at least for some products) that maximises profits (identical for all firms) which, 
however, only allows them to cover their total costs (see footnote 31); this discrim-
inatory pricing vector is sustainable given that a potential entrant, besides hav-
ing to replicate the incumbent̀ s entire product line (not to be at a disadvantage 
with respect to scale and scope economies; it is clear that the relative positions of 
the companies in respect of costs depend on the amount of fixed costs, so niche 
players, who generally avoid most of the sunk costs of its competitors, will not be 
disadvantaged, despite its narrow product line or reduced outputs – being that the 
usual strategy of these niche players encompasses hope for survival in these partic-
ular segments and expanding its investment to become effective rivals, although 
for a variety of reasons, including its own limitations, they often succumb (Baumol 
and Swanson (2003: p. 676)), if he tried to enter with marginally lower prices than 
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to an increased output of this firm in this market, but as there is interde-
pendence of the outputs of its various products, this increase would push 
it away from the outputs leading to the operation at minimum cost of the 
other products, so it will be constrained to curb the increase in output in 
the first market. Meanwhile, the other firm, feeling to lose market share, 
would be obliged to react to the price level in the market not to stray too 
far from the optimum output, but the “story” is repeated due to its own 
interdependencies 33.
Thus, market forces impose not the adoption of the optimal vector out-
put-prices for each firm, but rather an interval of discriminatory prices 
in equilibrium (identical for all firms) 34, resulting in (better or worse) 
approximations to the optimal price-output vector for each company. 
Firms that operate closer to their optimal price-output vector have a com-
petitive advantage, which is unlikely to be sustained, but rather tempo-
rary, once the equilibrium is unstable 35.
3.3. Differentiated product markets
Where there is differentiation between the lines of products offered by the 
firms, the conventional analysis conjectures that differentiation will be 
enough for each firm to face a non-perfectly elastic demand, which allows 
for them to have some control over its prices (but not on overall market 
those of incumbents in a market (which could be profitable; see Baumol et al. (1988): 
p. 317-8 and earlier references in this work on this subject: pp. 45-6 and footnotes 15 
and 16), he would alter his globally minimising cost position, given the aforemen-
tioned interdependence of the outputs.
33 If the firm loses significant market share in that market, it will alienate its min-
imising production cost vector. But if it changes significantly its nonlinear tariff 
in that market, repercussions will be expected in its position within other markets 
where it operates.
34 Thus, this interval of discriminatory prices results from a kind of “consensus” 
among the firms operating in that market; it follows that the equilibrium is not sta-
tionary nor modifiable just by exogenous shocks, but it is instead highly dynamic, 
which is in accordance with the frequent price changes (daily in nature in many 
instances; see for example the case of airlines) which occurs in highly contestable 
markets.
35 Moreover, it would be more appropriate to say that there is an ongoing process for 
achieving equilibrium through a “repeated non-cooperative game”. 
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prices, under contestability conditions). This control over their own prices 
does not permit positive economic profit under free entry and exit.
The obvious conjecture is that, given the position and elasticity of the 
demand curve faced by a firm, which depends on the degree of market 
entry freedom (of substitutes) and the substitutability of the competing 
products, that firm will be induced to practise price discrimination in 
order to increase its surplus. Surely this practice is complicated by the 
effect of competition, but the role of price discrimination remains essen-
tially unchanged, with advantages for the firms, from a profit point of 
view, from the differentiation of quantity and quality (which will also 
lead to increased social efficiency). Under conditions of perfect contest-
ability (which, as noted above – see footnote 14 – is an economically sub-
stantive generalisation of perfect competition), the surplus obtained by 
the firms does not, however, permit positive economic profit.
3.3.1. Differentiated product markets / monoproduct firms
In the case of differentiated product markets populated by single prod-
uct companies, the heterogeneity between the offered products enables 
by itself the maintenance of imperfectly elastic demand curves under 
conditions of perfect contestability, in the tradition of the Theory of 
Monopolistic Competition (Chamberlin 1933).
We consider that, according to the model of Wilson (1993, Chapter 12.2) (it 
should be noted that it is not a random participation model), firms face 
induced demand profiles (by the effect of competition), maximising their 
profit through an optimal nonlinear tariff (inverse-elasticity rule for 
each differential market), and mandatory (see footnote 22), which under 
free entry only allows for zero economic profit (free entry influences the 
induced demand profiles) 36.
36 “The outcome from this jostling for competitive advantage is a set of tariffs, one for 
each firm, such that each firm’s tariff is the optimal response to the others̀  tariffs. 
This outcome is called an equilibrium of the game of tariff competition between 
the competing firms. Direct calculation of equilibrium tariffs is complicated by the 
interaction between the firms, but a simple procedure usually suffices: as in real 
life, repeatedly construct each firm’s new optimal tariff in response to the oth-
ers̀  firms’ current tariffs. This procedure usually converges quickly to the set of 
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The excess capacity is not significant (in contrast to what is postulated 
by the theory of Monopolistic Competition; the firm, practising price dis-
crimination, is not “obliged”, as the theory suggests, to operate in a lin-
ear price – output combination on its long-run average cost curve (CM) 37), 
depending on the relative positions of the cost curves and induced demand 
(D), being that the latter, by the effect of free entry, is diverted more to the 
“left” and its elasticity increases, as Fig 1. tries to depict; its position will 
be such that will just permit, through the revenue earned by the practice 
of Nonlinear Pricing, to reach only zero economic profit 38:
Figure 1. Monopolistic Competition with Price Discrimination
equilibrium tariffs.”: (Wilson, 1993, p. 302) where he describes the process whereby 
equilibrium is reached in these “monopolistically competitive “markets. 
37 The well-known Chamberlinian tangency solution (of the demand curve with the 
long-run average cost curve) seems, however, to be engrained enough (although 
Baumol et al. (1988: p. 330) underline that this solution for the “large-group case” is 
not the only one to be sustainable if we relax the assumption of profit maximisation 
in any period of time, a fact also recognised by Amado da Silva (1991: p. 141-2) build-
ing several strategic alternatives that are not limited to the “large-group case”); by 
way of example, Economides and Wildman (1995) depart from this solution to estab-
lish that equilibria with Nonlinear Pricing (more precisely, with binomial tariffs, 
postulating a solution of tangency of an average producer surplus curve) dominate 
equilibria with linear prices in monopolistically competitive markets, providing an 
improvement from the point of view of social efficiency. 
38 Basically, we will have a Ramsey Pricing situation, but where the regulatory role of 
the Ramsey number on the profit margins will be exercised by the actions of com-
petitors on the (induced) demand faced by the firm. 
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The equilibrium with price discrimination enables a decrease in excess 
capacity relative to equilibrium with linear prices (approximately yield-
ing qdp, contrasting with the output qcm’ provided by the traditional model 
of monopolistic competition – tangency solution), affording greater social 
efficiency, even without accounting for the effect on consumer surplus of 
a possible offer of greater product variety 39.
It should be emphasised that, in this way, the configuration obtained by 
the introduction of price discrimination is sustainable, since under these 
structural conditions, social efficiency is maximised (see footnote 14 in 
relation to domination and consequent sustainability of Pareto efficiency 
maximising tariffs in environments with increasing returns to scale and 
non-decreasing marginal costs; in the area of decreasing marginal costs, 
firms become more vulnerable to cream-skimming strategies and by-pass: 
see Panzar and Postlewaite (1984: p. 14) and footnote 40 on this possibil-
ity) unlike what happened with the generalised Chamberlinian structures 
(those that were not comprehended by the “large-group case”; see Baumol 
et al. (1988): p. 331-4) 40.
39 It is noteworthy that this possibility of having a greater product variety stems from 
the increase in the surplus that each producer may obtain by expanding its produc-
tion through the practice of price discrimination relative to equilibrium with linear 
prices; these additional profits induce entry of new competitors (leading to the ero-
sion of said profits, leading to zero economic profit in the Industry), providing sim-
ilar products, thus increasing the variety of products within the market.
40 Clearly, in conditions of decreasing marginal costs, a rival or entry candidate 
could develop a product similar to that of a particular incumbent and try cream- 
skimming (see p. 53, footnote 32). In this situation, the targeted incumbent would 
have to change its optimal price discriminatory tariff through price reductions for 
high demand segments and price increases for low demand segments, in order to 
derail this type of competition or entry, and then resume the optimal discrimina-
tory tariff; if the response of incumbents to such threats is fast enough, this type of 
competition is discouraged and may be considered that the optimal discriminatory 
tariffs are indeed sustainable; see Elhauge (2003a: Ch III.C. ) for a similar reasoning 
in order to show that reactive price reductions above costs by incumbents are not 
predatory, providing many practical examples (such as the policy of some retailers 
that automatically equalize any lower price that the competition might eventually 
offer). 
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3.3.2. Differentiated product markets / multiproduct firms
In differentiated product markets populated by multiproduct firms, regard-
ing the sustainability of price discrimination in perfect contestability con-
ditions, the reasoning constructed for the case of homogeneous products 
essentially remains (see section 3.2), but enhanced by the existence of con-
sumer lock-in. The maintenance of offered quantities by firms that gen-
erate the minimum cost and of the resulting discriminatory pricing vec-
tor is strengthened by the existence of product differentiation, which is 
a sufficient condition for the firm to face an imperfectly elastic demand.
4. THE QUESTION OF MARKET POWER
The existence of price discrimination implies that the demand curves for 
the various products of a firm (assuming multiproduct firm; yet we weave 
considerations that also apply to single product firms) are negatively 
sloped, which is traditionally considered a sign of market power, since the 
seminal contribution of Lerner (1934) (Baumol and Swanson 2003) 41.
However, as we have seen, in perfectly contestable markets, firms are 
driven to practise price discrimination as to recover common, fixed, 
and sunk costs (recurring; see footnote 18), maximising their output and 
obtaining zero economic profit, without possessing the power to restrict 
total supply in this market or its overall prices; i.e., without having mar-
ket power (see the following paragraphs, including footnote 42, for com-
monly accepted definitions of market power).
41 The Lerner Index, equated by the percentage excess of price over marginal cost, 
tested the degree to which a monopoly was exploited, which, for a profit maximiz-
ing monopolist, corresponds to the reciprocal of the firm`s demand elasticity. While 
Lerner has emphasized that its analysis was restricted to situations of monopoly and 
would seek, above all, to measure the deviations from the social optimum regarded 
to be obtained under conditions of perfect competition with products offered at mar-
ginal cost (see Amado da Silva (1991: section 3.4.) for a detailed analysis of the contri-
bution of Lerner in the broader context of the relationship between monopoly power 
and excess capacity), many authors, including those in the field of Antitrust, have 
linked the presence of market power with demand conditions faced by firms in vari-
ous market structures (see Baumol and Swanson (2003: footnote 8) for a listing of sig-
nificant references).
NONLINEAR PRICING WITHOUT MARKET POWER
59R E V U E D’ÉC O N O MIE IND U S T R IE L L E ➻  N ° 161  ➻  1E R T R IME S T R E 2 018
The key to overcoming this apparent paradox lies in the pivotal compet-
itive pricing definition: these would equal marginal costs in conditions 
of perfect competition (perfectly elastic demand curve, Lerner index 
zero), but in conditions of perfect contestability (which cover – see foot-
note 14 – perfectly competitive markets as a special case) it would be con-
ferred by the discriminatory pricing schedules that firms practise as a 
mere survival strategy dictated by structural market conditions (Baumol 
2002). The traditional approach (see footnote 41) did not foresee the latter 
cases, where prices higher than marginal costs do not necessarily indicate 
the presence of market power, following that the indiscriminate use of the 
Lerner index may indicate market power when it does not actually exist. 
Klein and Wiley (2003a, 2003b) specify that, in their view, a firm with 
positive Lerner Index has “economic” market power, taking some action 
over their prices (but that, under free entry, will yet fail to deliver positive 
economic profits) but not necessarily market power “from the perspective 
of Antitrust”, understood as the power to restrict output in the market 
and hence increase the market prices above the competitive level (and in 
this way earn a positive economic profit).
Thus, the definition of market power as the power to place price above 
the competitive level, remains valid, yet little functional, since the com-
petitive level can manifest itself in the form of a set of discriminatory 
prices that are difficult to define and quickly and unequivocally calcu-
lated (Baumol and Swanson 2003).
The alternate definition, which states that a firm has market power if it 
can restrict the total market output (by restricting its output), influenc-
ing the market prices as a vehicle to increase the income or profits (above 
zero economic profit) (Baumol and Swanson 2003) 42, remains as valid and 
functional, continuing to indicate the power to impose an inefficient out-
come that harms consumers (as opposed to the maximising social effi-
ciency result achieved through the aforementioned price discrimina-
tion – see pp. 50-4). Moreover, Baumol and Swanson (2003: pp. 682-3) argue 
that the evidence of monopoly power 43 on the part of a business should be 
42 Elhauge (2003a: p.727) notes that both definitions are often used by courts and schol-
ars, referring us to the work of Werden (1998) and Klein (1993) for confirmation.
43 Baumol and Swanson (2003), recognising that the distinction between monopoly 
power and market power is not clearly defined, note that monopoly power usually 
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the demonstration of persistent and substantially super-competitive eco-
nomic profits 44 supported by a sustained restriction of its offer (in order 
to show that those profits are not attributable to a superior performance 
of the company, resulting in a distinctive competence or the assumption 
of an extraordinarily high risk)  45, 46.
5. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
Once the crucial issue of sustainability of price discrimination in compet-
itive markets (or, more encompassingly, contestable markets; as has been 
referred (pp. 41, 51; footnote 14), the notion of perfectly contestable market 
is a substantive generalisation of perfectly competitive markets (Baumol 
et al. (1988: p. 271)) has been clarified, the presence of increasing returns 
to scale is thus reconciled with competition (contestability) (except for 
the polar case of natural monopoly, for which that fact was already estab-
lished by Baumol et al. (1988) through the Weak Invisible Hand Theorem; see 
p. 45, footnote 14). Keeping the already assumed, and restated above, per-
spective that a market is competitive if there is freedom of entry and exit, 
means strong market power, and use in the aforementioned article both terms ran-
domly. Elhauge (2003b) also states that it is usually accepted to define monopoly 
power as a “significant” or “substantial” market power, but the necessary degree of 
market power to enter the sphere of monopoly power has not yet been established; 
however, advocates, according to the Antitrust practice in the courts (which are 
primarily interested in determining whether a firm has sufficient market power 
to conduit exclusionary behaviour that impacts adversely the efficiency of rivals), 
that a firm must have at least 50% of market share to be a candidate for monopoly 
power.
44 Baumol and Swanson (2003) suggest its measurement in terms of rate of return on 
total investment in the firm.
45 However, Baumol and Swanson (2003) recognise that there are substantial practical 
difficulties in the economic profit estimation methodology, particularly regarding 
the availability of relevant data and differences in corresponding accounting con-
ventions and economic concepts. Therefore, they note that in many cases the evalu-
ation of market power will continue to use information on market shares, barriers to 
entry and the ability of competitors to expand output, which must be analysed when 
circumstantial evidence is the basis of the presumption of market power.
46 Freedom of entry and exit (Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)) obviously prevents the 
described phenomenon (positive economic profits supported by a sustained restric-
tion of supply) from taking place since it is not sustainable.
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regardless of the number of firms operating, we have seen in previous sec-
tions that the price sustainability above marginal costs in these markets 
enables firms to efficiently reconcile (specific) economies of scale with 
competition. The crossing between widespread increasing returns to scale 
in modern economies being verified and the intuition that competition 
is important in order to achieve efficient results constituted a paradox 
indeed; such crossing was deemed incompatible according to received eco-
nomic theory (Heal 1999) (a competitive market is efficient, but increas-
ing returns to scale precluded competitive equilibrium 47), and according 
to the Theory of Contestability, competition (in a broad sense) forced firms 
to adopt prices at marginal cost (except in the case of natural monopoly), 
which required, for the purpose of economic viability, for economies of 
scale to be “exhausted”, their unit costs remain constant in significant 
expansions beyond MES, and demanded quantities by the market at opti-
mal prices (equated to marginal costs) be superior to the MES, which was 
clearly “heroic” (see also footnote 17). The explanation of the sustainability 
of Nonlinear Pricing in competitive (contestable) markets in the present 
article contributes, thus, to reconcile the role of competition in the pres-
ence of increasing returns to scale. 
Once the issue of increasing returns to scale in competitive environments 
has been addressed, it is important to address, due to its ubiquity, the issue 
of asymmetric information in these environments, which, as already 
noted, is identified in various models as being one of the most important 
determining factors for the non-existence of competitive equilibria (see 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), who established that in environments with 
asymmetric information there may not be a competitive equilibrium due 
to lack of sustainability in Nonlinear Pricing systems; this article con-
stitutes the ultimate reference in this issue – hence this non-existence 
hypothesis being generically referred to (see Gale and Hellwig 2004 and 
Schmidt-Mohr and Villas-Boas 1999), as the Rothschild-Stiglitz Problem).
47 Heal (1999: p. xvi) refers, in this way, to the mentioned paradox: “It is puzzling that, 
although economies of scale are undoubtedly important in reality, our belief in the 
invisible hand, in the efficiency of competition, seems verified by observation and 
experience, although not supported by current theory. This suggests that our under-
standing of economies with increasing returns is far from complete. There may be a 
role for competition and markets in allocating resources in the presence of increas-
ing returns that we have not yet understood”
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Just as a (natural) monopolist simultaneously solves the issues related to 
the maximisation of social efficiency with increasing returns to scale, as 
well as asymmetric information using Nonlinear Pricing systems, we also 
consider that firms in competitive markets simultaneously solve the two 
mentioned problems through the same systems.
The issue of social efficiency maximisation was dealt with in the previ-
ous sections (see section 3.); note now that if firm prices are discriminated 
through their second degree variant, they will also overcome the problems 
posed by asymmetric information by inducing customer self-selection. In 
fact, as mentioned in the introductory section of this study, it is observed 
that Nonlinear Pricing is practised in industries close to the criteria of 
perfect contestability (see footnote 3, for the enumeration of some of these 
industries in such conditions).
Thus, firms operating in industries close to perfect contestability 48 
respond – through the use of Nonlinear Pricing systems – to the diffi-
culties posed by asymmetric information, which in adverse selection and 
moral hazard situations could lead to the documented “narrowing” of 
such markets to the point of their total collapse 49. This gives rise, within 
conceptual frameworks, to the possibility of the Invisible Hand (the doc-
trine of which primarily relates to the concept of competitive economic 
equilibrium efficiency in classic environments (Heal 1999)) acting in non-
classical environments with increasing returns to scale and asymmetric 
information, generating through competitive markets not a first-best sit-
uation, but rather in the realm of second-best (since there is the need to 
impart information rents to agents holding private information relevant 
to each market in question 50), which will nevertheless maximise social 
48 Let us recall that the concept of contestability encompasses that of competition, and 
just as perfectly competitive markets do not exist in reality, there are no perfectly 
contestable markets; there are good enough approximations and that is what this is 
about.
49 See Riley (2001) for an investigation into the developments, for twenty-five years, 
within Economics of Information.
50 The decrease in social surplus in relation to the first-best situation corresponds to 
the value of restricted quantity / quality by nonlinear tariffs constructed according 
to Nonlinear Pricing rules; it should be stressed that this decrease will, in each case, 
be only the minimum sufficient for a nonlinear tariff contributing its share to the 
firm`s breakeven, which is dictated by competitive pressures.
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efficiency in these situations 51. The market system will only transmit all 
necessary information for economic agents in the form of prices if they 
have the right incentives for revealing their entire utility functions and 
production possibilities (private information) in return for information 
rents. The result for each market is not first-best because of the need to 
grant information rents, but it is more efficient than if the Invisible Hand 
were “not to function” due to the presence of increasing returns to scale 
and asymmetric information, as is traditionally postulated.
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